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AN

ANSWER to a PAPER

Written by

Count d'Avaux,

The *French* King's Ambassador in *Sweden*,

Concerning the

PROPOSALS of PEACE

MADE BY

FRANCE

TO THE

CONFEDERATES.

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AN

ANSWER

TO A

PAPER written by the Count d' Avaux, concerning the Propoſals of PEACE made to the Allies by *FRANCE.*

I.

ONE ſhall hardly meet with a *more ſpecious and ſubtle Paper*, than that by which the *Count d'Avaux*, the *French* King's Ambaſſador in *Sueden*, has ſupported the *Offers and Conditions of Peace* made by his Maſter. Every thing there ſeems plauſible; and if one only conſiders the beautiful and lively *Colours* which he ſo artificially makes uſe of, one would think that all the Reaſon and Juſtice lay on the *French* King's, as all the Wrong on the Confederates ſide; and this too in an Affair of the higheſt nature, ſince 'tis to put an end to an almoſt General War amongſt Chriſtians in all the parts of the World, and to reeſtabliſh a Peace which is to decide either the *Liberty* or the *Dependancy* of all the Princes and States in *Chriſtendom.*

But whereas in Affairs of this Importance, inſtead of being drawn in by outward appearances we ought to *ſound the bottom*, let us narrowly enquire into his manner of Reaſoning, without any Paſſion or Prejudice, which are as *blind Guides* as they are *depravd Counſellors.*

The matter in hand deſerves it; and if ever there was required a true Touchſtone in State-Affairs, we ſtand now in need of it.

II.

The Count *d' Avaux* endeavours ſtrait to remove the Fears of the Confederates; who conſidering the great *Eagerneſs* the *French* King ſhows *to enter upon a Treaty of Peace*, have a ſhrewd gueſs, That his only Deſign in doing ſo, is *to ſeperate and diſunite them*. In order to which he alledges, That the King his Maſter has offered advantageous Terms *to all* (not excepting any of) *his Enemies*.

III.

Now to judge whether *theſe Fears are well or ill grounded*, we ought to remember what has been done in this Affair *in particular*, with the *Duke of Savoy*, the *Emperor*, the *Elector of Bavaria*, and even to the *King of Spain*, by the *Holy Father*'s Mediation.

Again, we ought to conſider what pains have been taken to make this War paſs for a *War of Religion*, with the *zealous Roman-Catholicks*. The Emergency of the *Affairs of England*, and the late *King James's Misfortunes*, have furniſh'd *France* with ſome *ſpecious Pretences* for it. With the *Proteſtant Princes* other Engines have been ſet at work, and a ſhow has been made of ſome other Pretences, which the *Northern Crowns* can prove with a witneſs. Neither ought we to forget the famous Negotiation of the *Treaty at Nimeguen*, which was no ſooner ſet on foot, but *France obtain'd her Ends*, viz. *To ſeperate the then Allies*. An unhappy Seperation which plung'd them into all thoſe Misfortunes they have been forc'd to undergo ſince that time; and *which no man can give a better account of, than Monſieur* d'Avaux *himſelf*. 'Tis then this *ſad Experience* that has made them more *wiſe*, and 'tis alſo the *only and true Reaſon* that has oblig'd the *French King* to make Propoſals and Terms of Peace to every one of them, as having loſt all hopes of diſuniting them by Seperate Treaties.

IV.

But, ſays one, what means this *wavering?* Would it not be better to *enter ſtrait upon the matter*? Does it not ſeem ſtrange that the *Allies* have not thought fit as yet to make the leaſt *Declaration* about the *Terms propoſed* by *France*? That they do not name the *Place of Aſſembly?* Nay, that they will not ſo much as hearken to the *Preliminaries* of a Treaty? And has not *France* reaſon to cry out againſt this Conduct

duct of theirs, and to accuſe them that they will have no *Peace*; but that on the contrary they are reſolved to continue the War, for ends ſiniſtrous and prejudicial to the Tranquility and common good of all *Chriſtendom?*

V.

To which the *Confederates* will perhaps *anſwer*; *Firſt*, That they do not like that *Haughty Air of Superiority* which *France* aſſumes in making the *Propoſals*, as if it was *her due to give Peace to her Enemies*, when and on what Terms ſhe pleaſes. It was in this manner they were treated at the *Peace of Nimeguen*; a thing never before heard of amongſt Independant and Sovereign Princes. Neither have they forgotten as yet what *Statues* were erected in the *Place des Victoires*, and in the Court of the *Townhouſe* at *Paris*; what *Repreſentations* and *Inſcriptions* were made there; what *Panegyricks*, what *Speeches*, and what *Verſes* were compoſed; the moſt outragious and moſt ignominious to the other Sovereigns, that ever were heard of; even without ſparing the moſt Generous and Faithful Friend and Ally *France* had then, I mean the *Brave King of Sweden*, who after he had in thoſe times hazarded his Kingdom together with his *deareſt Intereſt* in favour of the *French King*, had no other Reward but the Injurious Reproaches of his having reeſtabliſh'd him on his Throne. Theſe are the fine and Immortal Monuments, which as they ſtrike a juſt Horror into the *Confederates*, ſo they make them cautious not to be treated ſo a ſecond time.

Secondly, It may be alledged by the *Allies*, That they find no Security for themſelves in the *Propoſals* made by *France*. They know but too well, and by ſad Experience, *That* France *acknowledges no other Limits to her Treaties, than what agree with her Deſigns*. 'Tis this which the *Pyrenean Treaty*, that of *Aix la Chapelle*, of *Nimeguen*, and the *Truce of Twenty Years*, the moſt ſolemn, and the moſt advantageous to *France* that ever were made, lay continually before her eyes, and of which they are yet more convinc'd by the *Maxims of the* French *Writers*, who maintain, That their King can *alienate* nothing of what once has been *incorporated into that Crown*; nay, That he cannot *renounce upon Oath* his Rights, whether true or but pretended, ſo as to *bind his Succeſſors* by it. Who will then aſſure us, That the Treaty that is now to be made, will laſt, I will not ſay for ever, but any longer than thoſe that have been made already, and which have been broken as ſoon as ever a fallacious Peace has firſt ſeperated, and then diſarm'd the *Confederates?*

VI.

But, ſays another, at this rate we ſhall have here an *everlaſting War*, ſince this laſt reaſon will always hold, and be ready to be made uſe of by the *Confederates* on all occaſions.

To which I anſwer, No; this is not in the leaſt their intention. They *deſire a Peace* as much as *France*, but it muſt be *a ſure, an honourable, and a general one*: And to obtain ſuch an one, they believe there are no other means but *to reduce her to ſuch Terms, as will make it her intereſt to live hereafter in Peace with her Neighbours, notwithſtanding her dangerous Maxims.* This is alſo without doubt the reaſon, why the *Confederates* have not as yet returned any Anſwer to the *Propoſals of France*; ſince there is ſome time required to agree amongſt themſelves about *an Anſwer proper to obtain theſe ends*, and which at the ſame time may be approved of by every one of them.

VII.

Monſieur d' Avaux maintains further, That one cannot wiſh for more advantageous Terms than the King, his Maſter, has offered the *Confederates*. This is a thing worth our enquiry.

VIII.

He begins with thoſe offered to the *States-General*, and that he may not leave *undecided* that queſtion, *Who is the Author of this War, and conſequently the Aggreſſor?* Since 'tis of great weight in this matter; he charges the *States General* of having been the *Cauſe of it*, by lending their Aſſiſtance to the *Prince of Orange*, that he might make himſelf Maſter of *England*. A mighty Point which it concerns us to enquire into.

All the World knows, That in the year 1688, there was no War in *Europe*, but that with the *Turks*, which of all the Princes and States that are now in *Confederacy* againſt *France*, the *Emperor* bore alone the weight of; all the reſt liv'd in a profound Peace; when *France* on a ſudden, being puffed up with her Fortune and Grandeur, and bent *to improve the opportunity* of ſecuring to her ſelf for ever, what ſhe did but enjoy for twenty years, made that *bloody Invaſion* into the *Empire*, that did ſo little expect it, as thinking it ſelf ſecure under the ſhelter of a *dear-bought Truce*. She attack'd and took *Philippsburg*, and poſſeſs'd her ſelf of all the *Rhine*, ſave only *Coblentz*, *Rhinfelt*, and *Cologne*; and 'tis to be noted, That this Invaſion

vaſion which was reſolv'd upon in the *Councel of France*, as ſoon as *Belgrade* was taken by the *Emperor* from the *Turks*, was executed immediately after, to wit, at the beginning of *September*, and conſequently two Months before the *then Prince of Orange* came over into *England*. What relation then has this War with the Aſſiſtance given by the *States-General* to that *Prince*? Since notwithſtanding there was then a *defenſive Treaty* between the *Emperor* and the *States-General* ſtill in being; yet their *Alliance* was not *renewed* till *May* 1689. by a *defenſive and offenſive Treaty*, being grounded on the *rupture of France*. This was not done till a year after the taking of *Philipsburg*, *Heidelberg*, *Manheim*, *Frankendal* and *Mayence*; and, in fine, after a general devaſtation of the *Palatinat* and the *Circles of the Upper Rhine*, *of Suabia and Franconia*.

France, as all the world knows, and as the nature of *ſo vaſt and unbounded deſigns* did require it, had taken her meaſures *to enſlave the Rhine*, before the *Prince of Orange*'s paſſing the Sea was ever thought of, either in *England* or *Holland*.

'Tis true, ſome time before its being put in execution, they began to ſuſpect *a deſign of the Prince*, by the fitting out a Fleet in *Holland*, and afterwards by an agreement made with ſome Princes of the Empire about ſome Troops of theirs, but 'tis no leſs true, that in *France* this *Deſign* was look'd upon as Chimerical, and thoſe as *Blockheads* that gave a hint in their Letters that it was laid againſt *England*. Howſoever they flattered themſelves, that they ſhould have done ſoon enough with *Germany*, to be able to bridle afterwards the *Prince of Orange* and the *States-General*; and behold here *one of the greateſt effects of the Divine Providence* that ever was! For 'tis certain that if the *French King* inſtead of invading the *Empire*, had ſent a good Army towards *the Frontiers of the Netherlands*, though it had been only to threaten them with a War; never could the *Prince of Orange* have been able to come over into *England*. The *Emperor*, the *Empire*, the *King of Spain*, had ſtill been in Peace with *France*; *England* had been Enſlaved by King *James*; and the reſt of *Europe* by the *French* King.

Beſides, we have ſtill place for another *Reflection*, which is, that at the bottom *France has put the Late King* James *out of*, *and ſet the Prince of* Orange *on the Thrones of* Great Britain. 'Tis long ſince that *France* looks *on the Power and Greatneſs of* England with jealous eyes, as the only Kingdom capable of *preſcribing Limits* to her unbounded Deſigns. For which reaſon ſhe has held for a State-Maxime, to de-

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ſtroy *England* by its own Forces, by *Domeſtick Troubles*, and *Inteſtine Wars*. She began to put it in practice in the Reigns of the *Two Charles's*, the Firſt and the Second; and thinking ſhe was juſt upon the point of obtaining her Ends, when *James the Second*, with whom ſhe had had a long and ſtrict Alliance, and *whoſe Bigottry and Ambition* ſhe but too well knew, mounted on the Throne, ſhe did not fail to improve that opportunity, and the Paſſions of that Prince, to puſh him on to a *Deſpotick* and *Arbitrary Government*, and the bringing in of *Popery* againſt the *Fundamental Laws* of the Realm, of which the *Engliſh* are more jealous than any Nation in the World beſides is of theirs.

This is a Truth the Late King *James* could not be ignorant of; and conſequently he might eaſily judge, that without a powerful Aſſiſtance *from abroad*, it would be impoſſible for him to compaſs ſo vaſt and ſo monſtrous a Deſign; and who was likelier to lend it him but the *French King*, puiſſant and dreadful to all the World? In ſhort, the thing was as readily granted as deſired; but at the ſame time it was whiſpered in the Late King's ear, that all would be in vain except the *States General* were overturn'd, as being the only in the World that might oppoſe his Deſigns; and that would infallibly do it by reaſon of the *great Intereſt*, which together with the *Prince of Orange*, their *Stadtholder*, they had in this Affair. Wherefore a Secret League was concluded between the *two Kings* in order to a total deſtruction of the *United Provinces*, which was to be put in execution on the firſt opportunity; and *France*, who had a mind to *ſtrike the Iron* whilſt it was hot, was not willing to put it off, till after ſhe had finiſht her *Conqueſt of the Rhine*, and forc'd the *Emperor* and the *Empire* to confirm her in the poſſeſſion of it by *a ſhameful Peace*, whilſt the Late *King James*, by the means of *his Army*, was to render himſelf Maſter of all at home, to the Subverſion of the *Government* and *Religion* eſtabliſh'd by Law in the Three Kingdoms. This is the true cauſe of all King *James*'s Undertakings in *England*, *Scotland* and *Ireland*, againſt his true Intereſt, which was to govern his People according to Law, and to oppoſe the pernicious Deſigns of *France*. But his having been drawn in by her, has coſt him very dear; for the *Engliſh* being reſolv'd not to outlive the loſs of their *Laws*, their *Religion*, their *Liberties* and *Properties*, call'd ſecretly to their aſſiſtance the then Prince of *Orange*, who was oblig'd to it by a thouſand Reaſons. But the *Prince* being wiſe and cautious, and knowing perfectly the conſequence of ſo great an *Enterprize*, *ſuffer'd himſelf long to*

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be ſolicited; and did not hearken at laſt, but to the *Threatnings* that were made him from *England*, to abandon entirely *his*, and *that Incomparable Princeſs* his Wife's *Intereſt*, and to give way to ſome deſperate Action, would have coſt them Rivers of Blood. Nevertheleſs, it was not till *Auguſt* 1688. that the *States-General* were acquainted with this great Affair; and they did not grant the *Prince* their Aſſiſtance, till the very time the *French King*'s Armies were on their march to invade the *Empire*, and to attack *Philipsbourg*, and then they were not like to refuſe it, ſince otherwiſe they would only have had the advantage of being ſwallowed up laſt.

Now this being well conſider'd muſt not one have a ſtrong Forehead to affirm that the *States-General* are the cauſe of this *War*? But beſides, in granting the *Prince of* Orange's Requeſt, did they do the leaſt thing againſt *France*? or did they *infringe* the leaſt Article of the *Treaty* that was then in being with her? There is no man of ſenſe can aver it; and *Monſieur d'Avaux* himſelf, in his thundring and threatning Speeches, he made then at the *Hague*, could alledge nothing, *but that his Maſter found himſelf oblig'd to aſſiſt his Allie.* Was it then requiſite that the *States-General* ſhould have tamely waited for the *mortal Stroke* that was prepared for them? and being perfectly acquainted *with the League of both Kings* that had ſworn their ruin, ſhould they have let ſlip the only means to ſave them, and which indeed ſecured them effectually from the Attempts of *France*, who was going to build on their Ruin her *vaſt Deſigns of an Univerſal Soveraignty* over all the States in *Europe*.

IX.

And now to come to the point; 'tis evident by what has been ſaid, that the *great Intereſt* the *States-General* have to obſerve by a reeſtabliſhment of *Peace*, is the ſecuring themſelves effectually for the future by Sea and by Land, without which, all they have to expect will be a ſuſpenſion only of their total Ruin, ſo much the more inevitable, the leſs hopes they can have ever to meet with ſo fair an opportunity as they have now at this preſent, to ſecure their *State*, their *Commerce*, and their *Tranquility* for the future. The fatal Conſequences of the *precipitated Peace of Nimmeguen* are yet too freſh to be forgotten; and the boaſted of *Barriere*, *France* offers to reſtore, will no more eſtabliſh their quiet for the future, than it has done for the time.

time past. Besides, *France* does not offer to restore the *entire Barriere*, since she pretends to keep *Luxenburgh*, of which more hereafter.

X.

Monsieur d' Avaux *passes but slightly over the Terms which the King of* Great Britain *is to have*; and it seems he fancies forsooth, *His Majesty* wants nothing but to remain in possession of his Three Kingdoms, and that on that score he'll not scruple *to restore what* England *has taken from* France *in the* West-Indies. But in this Monsieur *d' Avaux* is so much out of the road, that we have reason to doubt whether *Their Majesties* will ever permit that it be inserted as a Condition into a Treaty of Peace, that *France* is to acknowledge Their *Dignity* and *Title*, which is sufficiently establish'd by the *right of Blood*, and by the *Offer* the *Representatives of both Nations* have made *Their Majesties* of the *Three Crowns* after the Late *King James's Abdication*, and his *Retreat into* France. Besides, all *Potentates of Europe* having acknowledged the Title of, and congratulated *Their Majesties*, there is no doubt but *France* will be forced to make use of the same Language, in case she has a mind the *King* should ever enter with her on *Articles of Peace*. But do they think us tame enough to rest satisfied with that? or rather, do they not imagine we shall ask for somewhat more, some small Terms for our Safety, being acquainted, as we are, with the dangerous Maxims and Designs of *France* that tend to our destruction? Is it probable the *King* will abandon *his Principality of* Orange, and his other Lands by *Inheritance*, taken from him, and confiscated against all manner of Justice, a long time before the beginning of this War, and in the midst of Peace?

XI.

And what are the Terms propos'd to *Spain*? *Monsieur d' Avaux* talks very high and makes a mighty noise about them. *Five fine Places* taken in *Flanders* and *Catalonia*, which the King, his Master, offers to restore, are no Sugar-Plumbs, and his desisting from his pretensions to all the *Spanish Netherlands* in favour of the *Elector of Bavaria*, carries so mighty a weight with it, that *Spain* cannot but chuse to embrace these Proposals with both hands. But has not the *Catholick King* already rejected them with scorn, and declared rather to die, and to carry on the War all alone, then to accept them? Which if it be done with reason, we are now to consider.

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The *King of Spain* knows well that the Places *France* offers to reſtore, eſpecially thoſe in *Flanders*, will be no longer his, than during the *French* King's pleaſure; and that their diſtance from him, and their Situation, in regard to his Crown, will make them fall again ſooner or later with the *remainder of the Spaniſh Low Countries* into the *French King's* hands, at leaſt if it be not prevented by the *King* of *England*'s Aſſiſtance, and that of the *States-General*. Neither will a *Reſignation*, in favour of the *Elector*, contribute more to the fixing of that *Turbulent Humour of the French*, than that which was formerly paſs'd in favour of the *Arch-Duke Albert* and the *Arch-Dutcheſs Iſabella*. The *King of Spain* therefore will think perhaps fit, to demand ſome greater and more real *Pledges* of his Safety, by a *Barriere* that may effectually cover the reſt of his *Netherlands*; and 'tis left to every ones judgment, Whether he has not reaſon to demand them, after the frequent *Infractions* of the *Pyrenean Treaty*, that of *Aix la Chapelle*, of *Nimeguen*, and the laſt *Truce*, on the *French King*'s ſide.

In the ſecond place, *France* has a mind to keep for ever the *Fortreſs* and *Dutchy* of *Luxemburgh*, and the rather, becauſe the *States-General* have conſented to the leaving of them in her hands *during the ſpace of Twenty Years*, and that this Fortreſs is without the Barriere. But is there no difference between a *forc'd Reſignation*, and that only for ſome years, and a *voluntary one*, and that for ever? Beſides, we ought to conſider, that the *City* and *Province* of *Luxemburg* is of greater Importance to the *King of Spain*, than one half of his *Low-Countries*; not ſo much by reaſon of its Extent and Revenue, as by its commodious Situation, which opens and ſhuts the Gates to the Succors which he that is in Poſſeſſion of the *Netherlands* may expect and receive from the *Emperor* and the *Empire*; and *that it is a Bulwark of thoſe Provinces againſt* France.

XII.

But there remains yet another Point to be cleared, of a far greater, nay, of the higheſt nature; which is, That the *French King* in deſiſting in favour of the *Elector of Bavaria* from his Pretenſions to the *Low-Countries*, does ſtill *reſerve to himſelf his Pretenſions to the Succeſſion of the King of* Spain, *in caſe he ſhould happen to dye without Iſſue*. Which is in plain *Engliſh*, That in caſe a Peace ſhould be concluded to day, and the King of *Spain* happen to dye without Iſſue to morrow, we ſhould then have a new and as fierce a War as ever, in the old world as well as in the new one. *Monſieur d'Avaux* indeed calls this a very

Malicious Interpretation, and charges the *Emperor* with it, *as being the nearest concerned therein*. But he is not aware that he does himself establish and confirm it more than any body besides. For to maintain, as he does in his *Paper*, That the *Renunciation* made, not by the *French Queen* only, as he does insinuate, but also by the King her Husband, for himself and for his Successors; I say, that this Renunciation made upon Oath, and the most solemn one that ever was pass'd amongst *Sovereigns*, is *null and void of it self*; and to propose to the *King of Sueden* the *Arbitration* of that great Succession, What does it mean else, but that the *French* King pretends to it more than ever? Otherwise he should have spoke out, That the King his Master scorn'd to do it, as being resolv'd religiously to observe the Laws he has dictated to himself by this Renunciation. But by the way, *Monsieur d'Avaux* flatters himself, that by making these Proposals to the *King of* Sueden, *he has hit the Point in Politicks*, that will effectually engage that Prince into the *French King*'s Interest; and he boasts of it as an Honour that was never conferr'd on any Prince within the memory of men. Indeed to see one self an *establish'd Arbiter of a Difference* that concerns no less than the greatest and richest part of the *New World*, and so many Kingdoms and Provinces in the *Old one*, is a thing capable of flattering a mind, tho possest with the highest Ambition; and yet the King of *Sueden* is too Generous to be drawn in by it. If it was a difference of an intricate and dubious nature, something might be said for it; but since it is about the most frivolous and unjust Pretension that ever was, I think the *King of Sueden* has not much Honour done him by being made an *Arbiter* of what undoubtedly belongs to another. All *Sovereigns* are engag'd not to suffer an Example of such ill consequence, otherwise farewel all Right and Possession, since none would be the better for 'em. Would not the *King of Sueden* think it a great Injury, and a piece of the highest Injustice, in case it should be propos'd to him to submit his Kingdom and Dominions that undoubtedly belong to him, to the Decision of a *Third Person*, tho his Brother or his dearest Friend? And save this consideration, the highest that ever was, the *Emperor* and the *King of Spain* do confide so much in the King of *Sueden*'s Justice, Candour, and Generosity, that they would gladly receive him as an Arbiter in any other Difference but this: In this they'll undoubtedly stick to the *French King*'s sworn *Renunciation*, which excludes him from all Pretensions to the Dominions of the King of *Spain*, and the effect of which will never be removed, for

all

all either *Monſieur d'Avaux* can ſay, or the mercenary Pens of *France*, on which he grounds himſelf, can write; at leaſt as long as any Contract and Obligation amongſt Sovereigns does ſubſiſt, and Laws Divine and Human are in force.

XIII.

Neither does *Monſieur d'Avaux* prove better the pretended Nullity of this *Renunciation*, by reaſon that the *Spaniards* (as he pretends) have not diſcharged the Sums they were to pay in a limited time: For in the *firſt place* it ought to be prov'd that it has been the fault of the *Spaniards* that the Portion of the late *French Queen* has not been paid, and that they have had no reaſon to imagine, that the Arrears of the Portion of *Elizabeth of France*, *Queen of Spain*, and Mother to the late *French Queen*, might well account for it. But in the ſecond place ſuppoſe the *Spaniards* had been backward in this point, the *Contract of Marriage* of the *French Queen* does not ſay, That in caſe her Portion ſhould not be paid within the time preſcribed, the Renunciation made ſo ſolemnly to the Succeſſion of *Spain*, was to be null and void. By which it appears, That all the *French King* had to do, was to oblige *Spain* to perform the Contract, the *Renunciation* remaining howſoever entire, as having a *Motive* and *Object* far greater, more important, and more glorious than the Five hundred thouſand Crowns of the promis'd Portion can come to, that is to ſay, (to give it in their own terms), *To ſecure for ever the Publick Peace of* Chriſtendom, *and to procure the Common Good of the Kingdoms and Subjects of both Crowns.* The King of *Spain* and the *French* King being at that very time willing to prevent the Conjunction of both Crowns, *as being too big to be united into one.* After which can it be ſaid with the leaſt colour of Reaſon or Juſtice, That the *French King* has the leaſt pretence to annul this Renunciation.

XIV.

As to what relates to the *Terms* offered to the *Houſe of Lorrain*, 'tis a Jeſt to pretend that the *Empire* has no Right left to meddle with what regards that *Dutchy*, ſince the late Duke did not accept of what was ſtipulated for him at the *Treaty of Nimeguen.* The Empire ſays with far more juſtice, That *France* having broke that *Treaty*, can draw no advantage from it, and conſequently none neither in regard to *Lorrain.* 'Tis notorious moreover, that the late *Duke* of Triumphant Memory, did never accept of what Offers were made him at

that *Treaty*; for which reaſon the *French* King has no Right neither to the Four Highways in *Lorrain*, of the breadth of half a mile, that were granted him on that ſcore. But *France*, according to her celebrated cuſtom, boaſts of Treaties as far as they can be ſtretch'd to her Advantage; whilſt on the other hand, that part which does not ſerve her purpoſe, is moſt ſcornfully rejected. Beſides, we ought to obſerve here, That it is the *French King*'s way to *take away* with one hand what he *gives* with another. He'll deſiſt forſooth from his Pretenſions to the *Four Highways*, but he'll retain in exchange Four of the moſt important Places of that *Dutchy*, viz. *Sarlewis*, *Bintche*, *Homhourgh*, and *Longwy*, reſerving over and above to himſelf a Paſſage for his Troops through *Lorrain*, which alone would keep the *Duke* and his *Country* in a perpetual Slavery. But according to all appearance, the preſent *Duke of Lorrain* will find it as hard to perſuade himſelf to the reſigning of theſe Four Places, as his Father did when he was to grant the four Highways; at leaſt, he will not think himſelf to be very much beholden to the *French* King for it. In ſhort, if the *French* King will make us believe that he has a real deſign to reſtore to the *Houſe of Lorrain* what belongs to it by an undoubted Right, why does he retrench from it ſo conſiderable a Branch? Is it perhaps becauſe he ſtill grounds himſelf on ſome *ridiculous Treaties* made with the *old Duke of* Lorrain, Charles *the* IIId. poſſeſs'd in thoſe times with an implacable hatred againſt his neareſt Relations, and blinded by a fooliſh Love? And does he pretend that they are obligatory to the *preſent Duke*, who having had no hand in them, claims with a Juſt Right what belong'd to his *Anceſtors*, and what by the ſame Right is now his own.

XV.

After this, *Monſieur d' Avaux* examines the Propoſals made by his Maſter to the *Empire*, on which *he dwells the rather*, becauſe the *King of Sweden* is particularly concern'd therein. Let us follow him ſtep by ſtep.

He ſuppoſes before all things, That the *Treaties of Weſtphaly* and *Nimeguen* are to remain in their full force and vigour. To which we may reply by the by, That although the *French King* has rendred himſelf unworthy of what has been decided there in his favour, yet there will hardly be any diſpute about them on the Empire's ſide, eſpecially about the Treaties of *Weſtphalia*; but the queſtion is, *Whether the Propoſals made by* France *are capable of reſtoring thoſe Treaties*

ties to their full force and vigour? To which every reaſonable and unbiaſſed man will be obliged to anſwer in the Negative, and that we are to prove hereafter.

Beſides, the old difficulty holds here ſtill, to wit, How we ſhall be aſſured that the *French King* will better keep thoſe Treaties for the future, than he has done for the time paſt? 'Ts notorious, That that of *Nimeguen* was no ſooner executed, but he rais'd in the year 1680. a quarrel about his *dependencies* and his *frivolous Reunions*; by the means of which, though grounded only on ſome whimſical Titles and Pretences, and pleaded before *his own Courts*, where he was *himſelf both Judge and Party*; ſeveral Princes and States of the Empire were diſpoſſeſs'd of their Countries, there being found out a way to father always on the neareſt places a dependency from thoſe had been laſt taken. A goodly way indeed that would have Reunited at laſt the whole Empire to *France*!

In the year 1681, he Surpris'd and poſſeſs'd himſelf of *Strasburg*. The violences and outrages that were committed there, and ſince that time, are of a freſh date, and ought to be abhor'd by all true *Germans*, as long as they have a drop of blood in their Veins.

Monſieur d' Avaux pretends alſo, that the *Truce of twenty years* concluded at *Ratisbonne*, ſhould be converted into a *definitive Treaty of Peace*. But why would not the *Emperor* and the *Empire* conſent to it, when that Treaty was made, or ſince, before the new Invaſion by *France*? They would have prevented by it, what they have ſuffered from the barbarous Ravages and Deſolations that have been carried during this War, into the beſt part of *Germany*, but they had but too much reaſon to refuſe it. Wherefore to ſoften that Propoſition, which was from that time rejected, *Monſieur d' Avaux* thinks to have mended the matter by making ſome *Alterations* in it, which he cries up for ſo many convincing proofs, that the *King*, *his Maſter*, has no thoughts of making the leaſt *Conqueſts* in the *Empire*. Theſe Alterations are as follow, *viz.* Inſtead that heretofore, and ſince the Truce, *France* demanded that all ſhould remain *in Statu quo*, that is to ſay, that ſhe was to keep by a Peace all *Places* and *Provinces* ſhe Uſurped in the *Empire*, the Poſſeſſion of which was not ſecured to her but during the twenty years of the Truce; She offers now to ſurrender ſome of thoſe Places demoliſh'd, *viz. Mount-Royal*, *Trarbach*, and the Works of *Fort-Lewis* and *Hunninguen*, which Works being in regard to *France* on that ſide of the *Rhine*, the meaning of it is in plain *Engliſh*, That ſhe'll raze indeed the *Forts* built on the *German* ſide, to

cover

cover the *Bridges* of *Fort-Lewis* and *Hunninguen*, but as to the *body of thoſe Places*, Situated in regard to her on this ſide the *Rhine*, *She'll keep them*: She offers beſides to ſurrender *Philipsbourg* and *Frybourg* fortified, as they are now at preſent: She offers moreover to reſtore the *Palatinat* and the *Dutchy of Deux-ponts*; and beſides all this, ſhe'll ſubmit the *Affair of the Reunions* made for the time paſt, to the deciſion of ſome *Commiſſaries* to be named on both ſides, or to the *Arbitration* of the *Republick of Venice*. Now according to theſe *fair Propoſals*, If we'll believe *Monſieur d' Avaux*, the *French King* retains nothing, but only the *City of Strasbourg*, with the Forts belonging thereunto, which indeed by way of *Compenſation*, he'll keep for himſelf and his *Succeſſors* for ever.

XVI.

'Tis indeed a rare ſhow, to ſee what pains *Monſieur d' Avaux* takes to make the *Germans* reliſh theſe *Propoſals*, which with an *Aſſurance peculiar to a certain Nation*, he would have them look upon as a Favour his *Maſter* has a mind to beſtow on them. Add to this the cunning he employs to diminiſh the *Importance* of the City of *Strasbourg*, and it's paſſage, as alſo what he alledges to juſtifie his *Maſter*'s keeping of it. Inſomuch, that the firſt thoughts that come into one's head, on the account of ſo injurious Propoſals made to the Emperor, and the Empire, are, that according to the ridiculous *ditty*, or rather impertinent Satyr of his Country, *he takes them for Allemands*, or to ſpeak more intelligibly, for *Iriſhmen*, *That do not know ſo much as the bogs of their own Country*. But let us ſee how the matter ſtands.

In caſe the *Places France* offers to reſtore to the Empire, as an *Equivalent for Strasbourg*, were either part of the Kingdom of *France*, or got by that Crown *by a juſt Title*, 'tis agreed that they might hearken to the Places propoſed. But can they name one that does not belong to the *Empire*, except *Frybourg*, which was reſign'd to *France* by the *Treaty of Nimeguen*? On what ſcore then can the *French King* diſpoſe of *Places* that are not his own, and offer them as an *Equivalent* to the *Emperor*, to whom they undoubtedly belong? But, ſays *Monſieur d' Avaux*, the King, my Maſter, is in Poſſeſſion of them by *Right of Conqueſt*, and the *Emperor* is not like to retake them. To which I anſwer, 'Tis agreed that in caſe it were lawful amongſt *Chriſtians*, to Invade without either Reaſon or Juſtice, the Countries of their Neighbours when they leaſt think on it, and imagine themſelves

ſelves ſecure under the ſhelter of *Treaties of Peace*, or when they are employ'd ſomewhere elſe, as the *Emperor*, and the *Empire* were by a War with the Infidels, rais'd by the tricks and cunning of the *Moſt Chriſtian King*, and Fomented by his Treaties, and by his Supplies of Officers, Engineers, and Money; I ſay, if there was no more to be done but to take Poſſeſſion of another Prince's Country, and then offer to reſtore him one part of it, on condition to leave that which is the moſt conſiderable in the lurch; then, and then only would there be ſome ſenſe in *Monſieur d' Avaux*'s reaſoning. But what right, either Divine, or Human, did ever Authorize ſo unjuſt a Title of acquiſition? And what ſecurity could there be henceforward expected in the World, if this Practice once came to be allowed? Every Society would then be but a band of Robbers, where Force, Violence, and Tyranny, would take place of Right and Juſtice. 'Tis left to every one's Judgment, Whether it be not the Intereſts of all Princes to oppoſe with all their might ſuch *pernicious Maxims*. In effect, in ſuch caſes all Alliances are at an end, and none can be bound by them to Aſſiſt ſo inhuman and barbarous an Aggreſſor. It has been ſaid heretofore, how *France* Attack'd and Ravag'd the Empire in 1688. with the greateſt Injuſtice, and without the leaſt ſhadow of reaſon, by *Monſieur d'Avaux's own tacit acknowledgment, for it is a point he has not thought fit to meddle with*; and conſequently, if Divine and Human Rights are allowed to take place, the *French King*, far from getting any advantage by it, or keeping the leaſt foot of ground after ſo crying an Uſurpation, is bound to make Reparation, and the Offended Parties have juſt grounds to demand Damages of him for what he has caus'd them to ſuffer. But, good God! What Damages may there not be ask'd? *Entire Provinces* utterly deſtroyed; Cities that opened their Gates, relying on the Faith of Capitulation made with the *French Dauphin*, Raz'd to the very ground; Actions innumerable of Cruelty and Barbarity unparallel'd in all Hiſtories; what Reparation, I beſeech you, is there to be made for all this? Yes, to weigh all things rightly, a *good part of France* it ſelf would not ſuffice. Nevertheleſs, to make the *meaſure full*, inſtead of thinking to give the leaſt ſatisfaction, the *French King* ſets a price on his Cruelties; for theſe are the bloody Titles by which he pretends to keep what he has got by them. But, God be thanked, the *Emperor* and the *Empire* are not reduc'd to acquieſce in them, at leaſt they will not think themſelves much beholden to him for the offer he makes them to reſtore ſome of the places he Uſurps in the Empire, in lieu of the *City of Strasbourg*.

XVII.

'Tis this City which ſticks cloſeſt to the *Count d'Avaux*'s heart; for he leaves no ſtone unturn'd to inveigle the Empire to abandon it. At one time he endeavours to prove that ſuch a *Reſignation* is not contrary to the *Treaties of Weſtphaly*, ſince the *Emperor*, if you'l believe him, has infring'd them in regard to *Sueden* as well as *France*; and that in the Empire it ſelf Inſtances are to be found of divers Alterations made ſince thoſe *Treaties*. At another time he makes bold to maintain, That the City of *Strasburgh* has ſurrendred it ſelf willingly to its Maſter; that it is its Intereſt to remain under his Protection; that this City is of little or no importance to the *Empire*; and that unleſs it be reſign'd, there will be no quiet for it, nor any aſſur'd Peace between the *Empire* and *France*; and in fine, that at all hazards the blame of it can never be laid at his Maſter's door, ſince he has offered for it a more than ſufficient Equivalent.

All this fine Gibberiſh needs no Refutation. Neither do I think fit to meddle with that *Queſtion*, Whether an Alteration may be lawfully made in the Empire, againſt and after the *Treaties of Weſtphaly*; ſince it would be no more to the purpoſe, than the Inſtances *Monſieur d'Avaux* gives of it. All I have to ſay as to that Point is, That no part of the *Empire* ought to be diſmember'd from it, nor any Alteration made, except in Caſes of the higheſt Neceſſity, and when there are ſome great and viſible Advantages to be got by it. But what good will it do the *Germans* to abandon the *City of Strasburgh*? Or rather, What hurt will it not prove to them? *Since this Place is both the only Key to, and the ſole Bulwark of the Empire againſt the Invaſions of* France.

XVIII.

As to what regards the Accuſation of the *Emperor*, as if he had infring'd the *Treaties of Weſtphaly*, in the Wars of *Poland* and *Denmark*, *Monſieur d'Avaux* makes uſe of it as an *Argument that ſtrikes home*: But 'tis not fair to unravel things that have been buried in Oblivion by a Solemn *Treaty* in 1660. *Animoſities between Princes are not to be look'd upon as Eternal*, ſince they are not only obliterated by Time, but the Intereſt of their Country often changes them into a ſincere Friendſhip; as indeed ſince that time we have ſeen *ſtrict Alliance* made and kept, and a perfect Correſpondency reign between the *Emperor* and the *King of Sueden*, to their mutual Advantage and Satisfaction.

tisfaction. On the contrary, the *ſtrongeſt Ties are broken*, when that Intereſt which made them, happens to ceaſe: Witneſs *Sweden* and *France* after the Peace of *Nimeguen*; the latter having treated the firſt with great Haughtineſs, and all imaginable Scorn.

Yet ſuppoſe there had been ſome *Infraction* on the *Emperor*'s ſide, which yet the *Imperial Court* has formerly denied, alledging the *Defenſive Alliance* was then in being betwen the *Emperor* and *Poland*, *that was the Party invaded*; that Difference has been made up by the *Treaties of Peace*, and does not authoriſe the *French* King to do as much *after the Peace was made*. 'Tis ſo plain a Point that we need not enlarge upon it. Let us rather conſider what regards the *City of Strasburgh* in particular.

XIX.

Whether that City has voluntarily ſurrendred it ſelf, or not, is left to be decided by *Matter of Fact*, which is of ſo late a date, that we cannot but remember the Circumſtances of it. Three or four *Villains in the Senate*, *Traitors* to their Country, corrupted by *French* Money, and blinded by their ambition (one of which was ſoon after * *paid off* by the *French* King himſelf) did the buſineſs; and the poor Inhabitants reſolv'd to defend themſelves, were intimidated by the approach of a *French Army* ready to Attack them in the midſt of Peace. They ſaw themſelves without hopes of Relief from abroad, and without Advice from within by the Treachery of their Chiefs, and conſequently were forc'd to open their Gates. This is the conſent *Count d' Avaux* does ſo much brag of. The *French* King would undoubtedly look on ſuch Magiſtrates of his Towns as great Traitors, that ſhould act as thoſe of *Strasbourg* have done, and he would do it with as much reaſon, as there is but little now, to call thoſe of *Strasbourg*, *The beſt and ſoundeſt part of the Inhabitants*.

* A Principal Perſon concerned in the betraying the City of *Strasbourg* ſent for to *Paris*, under pretence of Reward, by the *French* King's Order, Baniſh'd to one of the remoteſt parts of *France*.

XX.

What *Monſieur d' Avaux* ſays of this *City*, *viz.* That it is it's Intereſt and Advantage to remain part of the Dominions of *France*, is of the ſame piece. 'Tis certain that it has found it ſelf well under the *Protection of the Empire* during ſeveral Ages, at leaſt that it has enjoyed a

full and entire Liberty in Matters Eccleſiaſtical and Civil; when on the contrary, it is now ſubjected to the Tyrannical Government of the *French King*, who alledges no other reaſon for his innumerable *Edicts*, *Declarations*, and *Ordonnances*, but what we always read at the end of them, *Car tel eſt Notre Plaiſir*. For that is Our Pleaſure.

XXI.

But for what a *Conjurer* would *Monſieur d' Avaux* paſs, and what a *Maſter* would he ſeem to be of the *Art of Perſwading*, if he could make the *Germans* believe, that this *City* is of little or no importance to the *Empire*, and that unleſs it be reſign'd, there would be no quiet for it, nor any Peace aſſured between the *Empire* and *France*.

To ſhow *Monſieur d' Avaux* that the Empire knows perfectly well the *value and importance of that Place*, and far better than he; be it known to him,, if he be ignorant of it, that upon this *City* depends the *Preſervation or loſs* of *three Circles* of the *Empire*, *viz.* of *Suabia*, *Franconia*, and the *Upper Rhine*, that is to ſay, *a third part of Germany*, that *Strasbourg being under the Protection of the Empire*, ſerves inſtead of a Wall to theſe three *Circles*; but that *being in the poſſeſſion of France*, it ſerves her by the rule of contraries as an † Inroad (as its name imports) as a Key, and as a *Place of Arms*, to invade, to ravage, and to enſlave theſe *three Circles*; that this Place being in *French* hands cuts *Germany* off from *Switzerland* on the ſide of the *Upper Rhine*, and renders them Maſters of that great and important River, from *Baſle* on to the very Gates of *Philipsbourg*, which *France* offers to ſurrender: And there needs no other proof of it, but a remembrance of the buſineſs of the Reunions and Dependancies which after the taking of *Strasbourg*, was carried on with more boldneſs and violence than ever. In ſhort, 'tis the moſt ſenſible breach of the *Treaties of Weſtphaly* that *France* can make, to deſire the keeping of *Strasbourg* by way of advance. Such a demand has no coherence with the foundations, the *Count d' Avaux* himſelf has but juſt now laid of the *Peace that is to be*, *viz.* That the *Treaties of Weſtphaly* and *Nimeguen*, are to remain in their full force and vigour. One might enumerate a hundred other Advantages that *Strasbourg* yields to the Empire, but we have ſaid enough to convince every reaſonable man of the great importance of that place to the *Germans*.

† An Inroad, or Highway, is called in the *German* Language, *Straſs*.

Again,

Again, to ſay that *Philipsbourg* is a greater Inroad into the Empire, and that conſequently 'tis of as great, if not greater, importance than *Strasbourg*, is ſtill to take them for *Iriſhmen*; for to ſpeak ſoberly, What compariſon can there be made between ſuch an inconſiderable Place as *Philipsbourg*, unwholſome by its Situation, block'd up within the Territories of the Empire, and which cannot contain but a *Garriſon of* 3 or 4000 men at the moſt; and *Strasbourg*, which with the Provinces that ſurround it, may contain an *Army of Fifty thouſand men*? Beſides by what has been ſaid, *Philipsbourg, as well as Strasbourg, ought to be reſtored to the Empire.*

XXII.

To anſwer alſo to the *Objection* that has been made, That as long as *Strasbourg* remains part of the Empire, there can be no aſſured peace and quiet between it and *France*; we *need but turn the Tables*, and ſay with more reaſon, that on the contrary, as long as *Strasbourg* is in the *French* King's Hands, all Peace, and all Treaties of *Peace*, will be in vain: For with what Patience can that great Nation behold in the Power of *France*, a place that has belong'd to them during ſo many Ages? that has been ſo Treacherouſly ſtole from them, that threatens them inceſſantly with a terrible Storm, ready to break out upon them on the firſt opportunity, and that in fine is the *Capital* of that beautiful and great Province of *Alſace*, in which *France* by the *Treaty of Weſtphaly* is only entituled to the *City of Briſac*, the *Landgraviat of the Lower and Upper Alſace*, in the ſame manner the *Houſe of Auſtria* did poſſeſs it, the *Suntgau* and the *Provincial Mayery* of the *Ten Cities*? Nevertheleſs *Count d' Avaux* paſſes over this great and delicate morſel in ſilence, and pretends to ſwallow it up without ſo much as ſpeaking of it. There are no inſtances, at leaſt for ſeveral Ages, That the *Empire* has Invaded its Neighbours. An *Offenſive War* does not at all agree with its Conſtitution, ſince to reſolve upon it, *more than* 200 *Voices are requiſite*, of Princes and States that are of a *different*, not to ſay *oppoſite*, Intereſts: When on the contrary all *Europe* ſmarts by the frequent Invaſions and Inſults of *France*: All Ages furniſh us with Inſtances of that kind, *and the preſent more than all the reſt*; And how can we expect better for the future from that unruly and turbulent Nation.

XXIII.

As to the Count's maintaining, That the *King*, *his Maſter*, offers the *Empire* a more than ſufficient *Equivalent* for the *City of Strasbourg*; we have already Anſwered, that the Surrender of whatever the *French King* has Poſſeſs'd himſelf of during this unjuſt War, is ſo far from being a Compenſation for that Place, that on the contrary he is holden to make the *Empire* Reſtitution of it with Coſt and Damages.

XXIV.

And indeed 'tis matter of wonder to ſee, That *Monſieur d' Avaux*, who is, and Writ in *Sweden*, dares not only advance, that more than Two thirds of the *Palatinat*, belong uncontrovertedly to the *Dutcheſs of Orleans*; but that alſo he takes upon him to offer and to diſpoſe as an equivalent of the *Palatinat*, and the *Dutchy of Deux-Ponts*, the latter of which belongs as undoubtedly to the *King of Sweden*, as he has Right of Succeſſion to the firſt. This is a Point indeed of the higheſt conſequence, but 'tis left to the deciſion of that *Prince*, who as he is moſt concerned therein, ſo he'll know without doubt, how to maintain his Intereſt. We ſhall only alledge here, the *Memorial* preſented in the year 1685 to the *Diet of Ratisbonne*, by the *Miniſter* of the *Prince Palatine*, in which it has been made out, that according to the Conſtitutions and Cuſtoms of the *Houſe Palatine*, which the *Duke* and *Dutcheſs of Orleans* have acknowledged by their *Contract of Marriage*, and by a ſolemn *Acquittance* delivered on the *Payment* of her *Portion*, the *preſent Dutcheſs of Orleans* has no manner of pretenſions, no more than the reſt of the Princeſſes *Palatin*, either to the Territories of that Houſe, or to what depends from them, as long as there are *Princes Palatine* and *Dukes of Bavaria* alive, who altogether deſcend in a *direct Line* from *Stephen Count Palatine* their *Common Father*, and *Author*, and *Founder* of this *Conſtitution*, which ſince that time has been acknowledged by ſo many ſolemn *Renunciations* of all the Princeſſes *Palatine*, and more particularly by that of the preſent Dutcheſs of *Orleans*. We'll content our ſelves alſo with admiring the boldneſs, to ſay no more, of *Monſieur d' Avaux* in offering to reſtore the *Dutchy of Deux-Ponts* in the *Condition* it was in when his *Maſter* ſeiz'd it; For what will become of the *uſe and revenues* of that *Dutchy*, he has enjoy'd during his *Uſurpation*? According to all Laws they ought to be made good at leaſt, to the *King of* Sweden.

XXV.

XXV.

As to what regards the *Reunions* made for the time paſt, and the *Propoſals* to ſubmit the deciſion of them to ſome *Commiſſaries*, or to the *Arbitration* of the *Republick of Venice*; 'tis of the ſame nature with the *Succeſſion of the King of* Spain, which we have examined already. The *name alone of Reunions*, Barbarous and unknown to all other Languages, will be for ever deteſted by the *Germans*, ſo far are they from diſputing about, and agreeing to an *Arbitration of that kind*. And would it not be a *tacit acknowledgment*, that *France* had had ſome reaſon to make them? For we ought never to enter upon the debate but of ſuch *Points*, that are not, as this is, obvious, clear, and evident on the *Empires* ſide. What if the Arbiter ſhould happen to decide in Favour of *France*, Would not that goodly work of *Reunions* go bravely on anew? And the *French Writers*, would not they have a fair play to maintain, that what had once been their King's Right, muſt be always ſo, in ſpight of what all future *Treaties* might decide againſt it? Far be it therefore from the *Germans* to ſubmit a certain and undoubted Right, to the chance of a doubtful deciſion. Beſides, the *French King* pretends to remain in Poſſeſſion of the *Reunions* till that *deciſion* be made. Now ſuppoſe thoſe *Commiſſaries, or the Republick of* Venice *juſt and bold enough*, to give theſe *Reunions* to the *Germans*, How ſhall they come at them but by the means of a New *War*?

XXVI.

And thus far have we followed *Monſieur d' Avaux* cloſe in the *Enquiry* of the *Propoſals* he has made; and tho we have reaſon to believe that we have ſufficiently demonſtrated the Injuſtice and Unreaſonableneſs of them, yet this will be more conſpicuous yet, if we conſider that there is not one of the *Allies* on whom the *French King* by theſe Propoſals does not endeavour to get ground; *and that he treats every one of them, as a Conqueror would do his vanquiſh'd and proſtrate Enemies*; of which I am going to give an Account, but in a few words.

France demands of *England* what has been taken from her in the *Weſt-Indies*; of the *States-General*, that they are to acquieſce in the renewing of the *Treaties of Peace*, and a *Commerce* with *France*, on the ſame foot as they were before the beginning of this *War*: Of *Spain*, the *Dutchy and Fortreſs of Luxemburgh*, with an Eſtabliſhment of her

Pretenſions

Pretenſions to the Succeſſion of that Prince: Of the *Duke of Lorrain*, Four important Places, with a Paſſage for his Troops, that are to pay for what they have: And of the *Empire*, the City of *Strasburgh*, with all its Forts; as alſo, That the *Deciſion* of the *Reunions* may be left to ſome *Commiſſaries*, or an *Arbiter*.

XXVII.

The *King of Sueden* was ſo ſenſible of the Extravagancy of theſe *Propoſals*, that when his Miniſters preſented them to the *Confederates*, they declared in the Name of the King their Maſter, *That it was by no means his Majeſty's Intention to Perſuade, much leſs to Force the Parties concerned, to acquieſce in them*: And yet *Monſieur d' Avaux* has the boldneſs (to ſay no more) to maintain to the *King of Sueden*'s face, That it is his Intereſt as well as for his Honour, to preſs the *Enemies of France* to accept of the *Propoſals of Peace* ſhe has made them; and that whoſoever talks to him otherwiſe, has no true Zeal for his Service, nor a due unconcernedneſs towards all the other *Princes of Europe*. Good God! who could have expected ſuch a *Declaration* from the *French Ambaſſador in Sueden*, who has ſo great a Reputation? We need not again but turn the Tables, and ſay with much more truth, That it is the *King of Sueden*'s Intereſt, as well as for his Honour, to preſs *France* to grant the *Allies* more juſt and reaſonable Terms; and that whoſoever talks to him otherwiſe, has no true Zeal for his Service, nor a juſt unconcernedneſs towards the *French* King: I ſay, we might ſay all this; but we have too much Reſpect for that *King*, and too much Conſideration for his *Miniſters*, to reproach them with what they do not deſerve.

XXVIII.

Nevertheleſs let us examine the *Conſiderations Monſieur d' Avaux* alledges in order to ſupport his Reaſons, and to make the King of *Sueden* reliſh them: One regards his Intereſt, and the other engages his Honour.

By the firſt he pretends, That the *Houſe of Auſtria* being the common Enemy of *France* and *Sweden*, as the two only Kingdoms capable of oppoſing its Deſigns of an *Univerſal Monarchy*, (which if you'll believe him, ſticks cloſe to its heart) and of protecting the *Liberties* of the *Princes of the Empire*; that this *Houſe* makes it its ſtudy to raviſh from theſe Crowns the Territories they are in poſſeſſion of in *Germany*; for which reaſon, ſays he, 'tis the Intereſt of *both Kings* to maintain

maintain their Ancient Union; and that the King of *Sueden* is ſo much the more obliged thereunto, *becauſe in caſe it ſhould happen that France notwithſtanding all her Victories by Sea and Land, ſhould loſe a conſiderable Battel at laſt, he would hardly be able to raiſe the dejected Party.* On the other hand, he maintains, That 'tis no leſs the *Intereſt of the King of* Sueden *to prevent the* French *King's falling off at Sea*, and to oppoſe the Tyranny which the *Engliſh* and *Dutch* endeavour to eſtabliſh there.

XXIX.

To hear *Monſieur d' Avaux* reaſon at this rate, one would be apt to think he had quite forgot the *Circumſtance of Time.* If his *late Uncle* had made this Harangue at the *Treaty of Munſter*, it might have paſs'd; but what *Alterations* have we not ſeen ſince that time in the *Affairs and Intereſts of State?* Has it been forgotten, that ſince the *Peace of Munſter*, and eſpecially during and after the *Negotiation* at *Nimeguen*, *France* has endeavour'd to mortify the King of *Sueden* a hundred ways, to create him Enemies, and to entangle him into Wars? That ſhe has diſpos'd of the Lands of that Prince, as if he had been under her Guardianſhip, and of her Dependancy: That ſhe has abus'd his *Miniſters*: That ſhe has made a League againſt him, and come to that height as to ſend her Squadrons againſt him into the Sound: That ſhe has offered to hinder him from making Defenſive and Harmleſs Alliances; witneſs the noiſe ſhe made at *Ratisbonne* and in other places, againſt that was then made between the *Emperor*, the *King of Sueden*, ſome *Electors*, and ſeveral *Princes of the Empire*, in the very ſame year ſhe made an end of her ſeizing the Dutchy of *Deux-ponts*; where ſhe had no more regard for the *King of Sueden*, than ſhe would have had for the leaſt State of the *Empire*. On the other hand, Is it not viſible, that at the preſent Juncture of time, the *Emperor*'s and *King of Sueden*'s Intereſts are abſolutely the ſame? And that 'tis morally impoſſible to ſeperate them, *ſince one cannot be ſav'd without the other.* And 'tis for this reaſon, that the Houſes of *Brandenburgh* and *Lunenburgh* are in a ſtrict Alliance with *that King*; and that far from thinking of getting ground upon him in the Territories he poſſeſſes in *Germany*, they are as ready, as they are oblig'd, to defend them againſt any body whatſoever.

But how does this agree with the pretended *Union of Intereſt* which is imagin'd to ſubſiſt at preſent between *France* and *Sueden?* Is it not ridiculous to endeavour to move the *King of Sueden* to authoriſe and

to

to be the *Guarantee* (if one may ſay ſo) of the *Superiority* and the *Conqueſts* of the *French King?* ſince the latter has declared and made War againſt the *Empire* and its *Allies*, without acquainting him in the leaſt with it; *nay, rather againſt himſelf*, in his Dutchy of *Deux-Ponts*, and by the Deſolation of the *Palatinate*. Beſides, *France* demands this *Guarantee*, without being willing to let the King of *Sueden* ſhare in the Conqueſts ſhe has made, and that are directly againſt his Intereſt: For 'tis evident, that if the War with the *Confederates*, and the need the *French* King ſtands in of *Sueden*, had not brought him a little to reaſon, never would he have thought of reſtoring the *Dutchy of Deux-Ponts* to its right Owner: Nay, he would have pretended alſo to retain the *beſt part* of the *Palatinate*, to the prejudice of the Ancient and Natural Rights of Succeſſion of *that King*. Was there ever ſuch a Confederacy, unleſs that of the Lion in the Fable?

XXX.

But what did *Monſieur d'Avaux* dream of, when he accus'd the *Houſe of Auſtria* of *aſpiring to an Univerſal Monarchy?* Does he think that all the world is either blind or out of their wits? For if a *Philip* II. in the laſt, or a *Ferdinand* II. in the preſent Age, have perhaps conceived ſuch a Deſign, being tempted to it by the Greatneſs of their Power, and encouraged by their Victories, *it has been buried with them, and none but* France *has inherited it; ſhe being in reality now, what the Houſe of* Auſtria *was formerly*. We have ſeen with our eyes, that ſince the *Pyrenean Treaty France* has not only affected an Arbitrary and Abſolute *Government* over all the *Princes* and *States* in *Europe*, but that ſhe has actually exercis'd it. We appeal to 'em all, whether one can ſay that he has been exempted from it. Thoſe whom Nature has made their Neighbours, have been all either ſwallow'd up, or put out of a condition to reſiſt; and thoſe whom a kinder Heaven has remov'd from her, have felt her Inſults and Threatnings. And without entring into Particulars, which would perhaps be tedious, 'tis enough to make the *King of Sueden* remember, as we have already ſaid, how he has been us'd by *France*, eſpecially when ſhe ſent a Squadron againſt him into the *Sound*, which till then had never been heard of. For 'tis worth our while to know, That *France* affects no leſs a Sovereignty over the Seas, than ſhe does over the Land; and 'tis for this Reaſon, and not that Monſieur *d'Avaux* alledges, That *England* and *Holland* have united themſelves againſt Her.

And

And now 'tis left to every one's judgment, Whether it be for the *King of Sueden*'s Advantage, to aſſiſt the *French King* in the proſecuting of theſe wicked ends, as he would do by procuring him ſuch Advantageous Terms of Peace as he demands; and by which he cannot but get more ground upon his Neighbours, and augment conſiderably his Power: Or rather, Whether it be not *his true Intereſt* to oppoſe it with all his might, together with all other Princes concerned therein, and to hinder that *France* may not get the better by this War, by obliging her to reſtore what ſhe has ſo unjuſtly taken from her Neighbours. For, in fine, if ſhe has committed ſo many Outrages before ſhe was in Poſſeſſion of *Strasburgh*, *Luxemburgh*, and ſo many other *Places* and *Provinces*, what will it be for the future, if ſhe comes to keep 'em by a Peace? *Two years of a good Harveſt and Trade* will make up all her Loſſes, and render her more powerful than ever, and put her in a condition to make all other Princes ſenſible of the deplorable effects of her Turbulent Humour and Ambition. Now is the time to throw off that Yoke we have felt ſo heavy. If we let it ſlip, never muſt we hope to ſee it again. *For what appearance is there to expect ſuch another Juncture, or to ſee again ſo many Means and Forces which a happy Deſtiny has now united, on purpoſe to deliver us from Slavery and Bondage? Or now, or Never.*

Neither is it to be fear'd the thing ſhould be ſtretch'd too far, and the Enemies of *France* grow too great, by Her becoming leſs; as yet Monſieur *d' Avaux* endeavours to inſinuate, *by a Confeſſion that undoubtedly has coſt him very dear.* Ah! how far are we yet from it, and how many things are there ſtill required, to put the Scales into a Balance, which now entirely incline towards the *French ſide?* There are ſome Limits may be preſcribed to make that Balance even; which will be done, *if things be ſet in the ſame poſture they were in immediately after the* Weſtphaly *and* Pyrenean *Treaties*; for 'tis from that time onwards, that *France* did extremely outweigh the Balance.

XXXI.

And now we are come to *Monſieur d' Avaux*'s *Second Conſideration* which he lays before the King of *Sueden*, in order to engage him to his Maſter's Intereſt, on account of his own Honour.

The King his Maſter, he ſays, has ſtrait accepted of the *King of* Sueden's *Mediation*; and on the contrary, *the Confederates*, (if you'll believe him) have rejected it, as being unwilling to hearken to any Peace, for ſome particular Ends of the *Emperor*, and the *King of*

Great Britain; and from thence he concludes, that the *King of Sweden* is in Honour engag'd to make himself to be look'd upon as a Great Prince, such as he ought to be; that is to say, according to *Monsieur d' Avaux*, *he should either procure Peace to* Christendom, *or side with one of the two Parties*; it being the thing he advances at the beginning of his Paper.

Now tho we may very well admit of this *Proposition*, That the *King of Sweden* ought either to procure Peace to *Christendom*, or side with one of the two Parties, yet the *Question* is, To what Party his Honour, Glory, Reason, Justice, and own Interest ought to incline him; and we need but open our eyes to see that he ought to join with the Confederates, as we have already proved by all we have said in this *Answer*.

In the mean time, 'tis not true that the *Confederates* have rejected the *King of* Sweden's *Mediation*; they are, on the contrary, ready to embrace it, persuaded as they are, of his *Majesty*'s Justice, Equity, Candor, and Generosity. 'Tis then the *French King*'s fault alone, that the *Mediation of Sweden* has not as yet taken any effect in a *Treaty of Peace*; and this Obstacle will not be removed, as long as the *French King* sticks to his Propositals, which he calls his *Ultimata*; and the Confederates can never accept of, since instead of a sure and durable Peace, they would only obtain by them a *delay of their Ruin and Misery*; and that if they should take place, *France* would soon be in a condition to begin a New War and fiercer than ever; and that at the latest, in case *Europe* should have the misfortune to see the King of *Spain* die without Issue; in the mean time *France* under the shadow of Peace, would be busie in endeavouring to embroil the Affairs every where, especially in *England* and *Holland*, which as they are the two great Obstacles to her vast Designs, so are they also the Objects of her Hatred.

XXXII.

But let us make an end by remembring the *King of Sweden* once more, That the work of an honourable, sure, lasting, and general Peace, seems to be reserv'd in a great measure to his Glory: That he needs no more but desire it, by obliging *France* to restore all things in regard to the *Empire*, into the same condition they were in by the *Treaties*

Treaties of Weſtphaly; and in regard to *Spain*, if not exactly according to the *Pyrenean Treaty*, yet the neareſt to it, as Juſtice, and the ſecurity and welfare of the Catholick Countries and *Europe* requires; and finally, to let the other Confederates have alſo a juſt and reaſonable Satisfaction; which being done, there will be no more diſpute about the *Propoſals of Peace* that then will offer themſelves.

FINIS.

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